The CEC publishes the election data in a machine-readable format. The data file can be downloaded here. In one and only one of the files submitted by a machine, a cryptographic signature dated Apr 12 20:02:26 2023 GMT is visible. Such an event is excluded without any manipulation of the machine software or subsequent manipulation outside the section. But having a date from the future is an alarming sign that one or the other is possible. It is worrying that the controls of “Information Services” have not caught such an obvious error. A provocation against the reliability of machine voting is not excluded.
We are talking about the file 302200028.csv.p7s – which is an electronic signature for 302200028.csv, corresponding to RIK 30, Novi Pazar municipality, Pamukchii village, 1 Svoboda Str. The machine in this section has serial No: CHCA4E1A00012651, model: A4517
The file can be read with the following command:
openssl cms -cmsout -in 302200028.csv.p7s -inform PEM -noout -print
In the results with information about the signing certificate read UTCTIME:Apr 12 20:02:26 2023 GMT, that is, the result file is signed in the future.
In all other 9,491 files, the date corresponds to Election Day April 2, and the time is shortly after 8 p.m., when Election Day ends. In rare cases, the signing was made a few minutes before 8 p.m., but not more than 20 minutes.
Who signs?
In the last two national elections, the resulting file from the machine is signed with a certificate of a member of the SIC, which is issued by “Information Services”. Previously, the file was signed with the certificate on the machine itself.
It is impossible for a member of the SIC to manipulate the certificate issued to him, or the machine, unless he is some kind of computer guru. The probability that exactly in the village of Pamukchii, Novi Pazar, such a specialist has been found tends to absolute zero.
On the other hand, the probability of keeping copies of certificates distributed to the SIC in IE is not to be excluded. This would give them the opportunity to manipulate whoever they want.
An accident or a provocation?
The date from the future may be an incident or intentional insertion of such an error, for a certain purpose.
The theory of an unintentional incident does not cancel out concerns that the controls at the entrance to the count did not work. If it is assumed that the wrong date was entered manually and unintentionally at the time of installation of the machine, then when counting it should be detected, and this did not happen. And here the question arises which more controls for reporting machine voting have not worked or have been excluded?
The theory of deliberately inserting such a date has a logical explanation in the context of the struggle between “machine” and “paper” coalitions. The date of the future cannot go unnoticed by computer-literate people and this will pour water into the mill of the “paper” coalition: “Here you go, see? The results of the machines or the machines themselves can be manipulated.” Another useful consequence for the paper parties is that such a debate will divert attention from the falsifications of the paper vote – the protocols full of errors, strikeouts, disrespected votes and inoperative controls.
There is a way to check and find the source of the date from the future and it is in the hands of the CEC. You can still check the flash drives from the memory of the machines. On each flash drive there is an audit partition that is protected by 3 cryptographic keys. It is necessary to compare the information from the audit share, which cannot be manipulated, and the protocols, which, as can be seen, can be signed from the future.
Such an audit operation, however, is tantamount to opening the election “Pandora’s Box” because it can bring to light many other manipulations. No doubt the idea will face fierce resistance. And time goes by and in a few days the flash drives will be erased. Maybe on April 12th?
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